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I. Introduction 
Professor Yackee’s paper, “Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? 
Or, Toward Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” offers a 
useful reminder to social scientists and lawyers alike that each can benefit from the other 
in order to generate more reliable empirical studies in the legal field. On that point, 
Professor Yackee and I agree. We also agree on several points that flow from that basic 
premise, namely that the law can benefit from empirical research; that reliable empirical 
research requires sound methodologies that social scientists are best suited to provide; 
and that empirical studies assessing legal issues must be based on accurate underlying 
assumptions that lawyers are best suited to provide. 
Professor Yackee and I diverge, however, when it comes to the methodology and 
underlying assumptions he employs in the example he has chosen to demonstrate that 
sound empirical research requires an interdisciplinary approach. In his paper, he 
critiques a 2010 article by social scientists Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, entitled 
“Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining over Dispute 
Resolution Provisions.” Specifically, Professor Yackee challenges the underlying 
assumptions and the corresponding values assigned by Professors Allee and Peinhardt in 
coding the “strength” of investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) clauses in bilateral 
investment treaties (“BITs”) to test their theory that the variance in ISDS clauses can be 
explained by the relative bargaining power of States. Professor Yackee offers an 
alternative ranking of the strength of ISDS clauses in order to demonstrate the value of 
collaboration between social scientists and lawyers. 
In this response, I offer different views on the role of empirical research in the law, the 
value of collaboration, and the relative strength of ISDS clauses providing for resolution 
of disputes in different arbitral fora, based on my experience as a practitioner regularly 
using empirical data and frequently grappling with the themes underlying Allee and 
Peinhardt’s study. Part II of my response makes two preliminary observations that I 
believe should inform the approach to interdisciplinary collaboration in the development 
of empirical studies about law. Part III discusses specific critiques of Professor Yackee’s 
model, and suggests alternate values for coding the strength of ISDS clauses in BITs. In 
Part IV, I use Professor Yackee’s data to run a regression model using my alternate 
coding system. As will be discussed, my results vary markedly from Professor Yackee’s 
and suggest some conclusions about both the methodologies employed in empirical 
research and the important role lawyers can play in that research.  
II. Preliminary Observations 
As Professor Yackee notes, a primary line of empirical research on BITs considers 
treaties as dependent variables and attempts to explain why States sign BITs or why 
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they sign BITs with particular provisions.1 The answers to these questions can provide 
critical guidance to arbitral tribunals interpreting those provisions and to counsel 
arguing in favor of a particular interpretation. Thus, as an initial matter, I agree with 
Professor Yackee’s first basic premise: Empirical research has an important place in legal 
scholarship, and, in particular, in the study of international investment arbitration. 
Professor Yackee’s second basic premise is equally non-controversial: At present, 
empirical legal studies are not sufficiently robust and can be much improved through 
greater interdisciplinary collaboration between lawyers and social scientists. On the one 
hand, the legal academy and profession are not well equipped to produce, and in some 
instances are not producing, reliable empirical results. Far too many examples exist of 
the “fluid” use of statistics by lawyers, and, as a profession, we must become more self-
critical of our shortcomings in this area and strive to import methods that social 
scientists consider reliable (defined as being replicable and consistent) and valid (defined 
as being free from bias). At the same time, studies on law and legal phenomena that are 
produced by social scientists, such as the study by Professors Allee and Peinhardt, can 
suffer from the authors’ lack of legal training and fundamental misunderstandings as to 
how the law works and is perceived by those who practice it. As Professor Yackee rightly 
observes, it is unrealistic to expect either camp to become expert in the other’s 
methodologies. 
But the idea that both sides can benefit from collaboration—that is, that lawyers have 
something to add to empirical research on law—should not be surprising. The question, 
then, is how to operationalize the collaboration, how best to draw on lawyers’ expertise 
and implement it into empirical studies on law. In this regard, two preliminary 
observations should be made. 
The first observation is that the search for expertise should not be limited to the legal 
academy. Rather, it should encompass practitioners as well. This is not only for the 
obvious reason that practitioners may be experts in a relevant area of law, but also 
because there is a perhaps “hidden” repository of statistical expertise among those who 
practice law. As counsel in complex international commercial and investment disputes, 
practitioners are frequently required to cross-examine scientific and technical experts 
who are highly trained in the methodologies employed by Professors Yackee, Allee, and 
Peinhardt. In order to conduct effective cross-examination, practicing lawyers must 
develop fluency in the vocabulary of statistics to become as familiar and comfortable with 
the terminology and the underlying concepts as are the expert witnesses being examined. 
This familiarity and comfort with statistical tools and concepts makes practicing lawyers 
well-positioned to contribute to empirical legal studies in meaningful ways. 
 
1. Jason Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward 
Greater Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L 
277, 281 (2013). 
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My second observation is a methodological one. As we seek to improve the quality of 
empirical studies of law and law-related phenomena via interdisciplinary collaboration, 
we must emphasize the use of sound empirical methods. As Professor Yackee 
acknowledges, although he suggests a “reconstruction” of Allee and Peinhardt’s 
dependent variable—an alternative coding of ISDS clause strength—he does not perform 
a “replication” of their original study.2 That is, he did not apply his reconstructed 
dependent variable to Allee and Peinhardt’s original data. Thus, his approach does not 
present or permit a true comparison between a study of BIT provisions uninformed by 
legal expertise, and the same study informed by such expertise.  
While Professor Yackee’s transparency is commendable, for those seeking to draw 
reliable conclusions from such empirical studies, this approach can be deeply 
unsatisfactory. In short, Professor Yackee’s analysis is inherently limited by the lack of 
“replication.” If lawyers are to conduct empirical studies that produce reliable and useful 
results, we must embrace the proven methodologies of the scientific disciplines, such as 
data-sharing, replication, and peer review. 
III. Critiques of Professor Yackee’s Model 
While I agree with many of Professor Yackee’s observations and critiques of Allee and 
Peinhardt’s model, Professor Yackee’s own model in some respects suffers from what I 
view to be a flawed ranking of the strength of ISDS clauses.  
Professor Yackee’s model assigns the greatest value (2) to ISDS clauses providing a 
choice between ICSID and non-ICSID options, the second greatest value (1) to ICSID-
only clauses, and the lowest value (0) to ISDS clauses designating only non-ICSID fora. 
He excludes both BITs that contain no ISDS clause, and BITs that contain ISDS clauses 
covering only certain types of disputes. This latter category includes, for example, the 
early BITs of China and of the former Soviet Union, which limit arbitrable disputes to 
those involving “compensation for expropriation.”3 
Professor Yackee’s primary critique of Allee and Peinhardt’s model is that they rank 
ICSID-only dispute resolution clauses above dispute resolution clauses containing a 
choice of either ICSID or other fora. On this basis, Professor Yackee inverts Allee and 
Peinhardt’s ranking of a 2 for ICSID-only clauses and a 1 for clauses with a choice of 
ICSID or non-ICSID fora. I agree with Professor Yackee’s assumption that there is some 
value in choice and that “context matters.”4 In this vein, assigning a higher value to an 
ISDS clause with a choice of fora than to an ICSID-only clause seems logical. In the 
 
2. Id. at 292, 294. 
3. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-N.Z., Nov. 22, 
1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186. 
4. Yackee, supra note 1, at 288. 
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coding I propose, as in Professor Yackee’s model, an ISDS clause providing a choice 
between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration is assigned a 2. 
My first point of departure from Professor Yackee’s model concerns his assignment of 
a value of 1 to ICSID-only clauses and 0 to clauses designating only non-ICSID fora. 
Professor Yackee surveys the relative merits of ICSID versus non-ICSID arbitration, and 
concludes that it is only “arguable” that an ICSID-only clause is better than a clause that 
provides only non-ISCID options because “the case that ICSID is necessarily and 
significantly better than the leading alternatives is not so clear.”5 Yet his reconstruction 
continues to privilege ICSID-only ISDS clauses over clauses that provide exclusively for 
non-ICSID arbitration. This ranking relies on the same flawed and statistically 
unsupported assumptions that Professor Yackee himself challenges—that ICSID is 
better for investors than non-ICSID arbitration and that investors prefer ICSID to non-
ICSID options.  
Even accepting the limited data available, we can and should still make informed 
observations about the preference that investors or home States accord to ICSID versus 
non-ICSID arbitration. First, based on the available numbers alone, it is not clear that 
ICSID actually is the preferred forum. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”) reports that as of the end of 2011, a total of 279 investment 
arbitrations were brought under the ICSID Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
while 126 were initiated under the UNCITRAL Rules, 21 under the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (“SCC”) Rules, seven under the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) Rules, one under the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”) Rules, 
and one under the rules of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial 
Arbitration.6 Of the 279 cases brought under the ICSID Rules or Additional Facility 
Rules, approximately 10 percent fell into the latter category.7 Realistically, Additional 
Facility cases should be treated separately because these involve non-signatories to the 
ICSID Convention and are subject to enforcement under the New York Convention 
rather than the ICSID framework. They are thus far more like UNCITRAL or other non-
ICSID cases than cases brought under the ICSID Convention. Adding the approximately 
30 Additional Facility cases to the 156 cases administered outside the ICSID framework, 
we begin to see that non-ICSID Convention investor-state arbitrations are far more 
prevalent than might be imagined. 
 
5. Id. at 292. 
6. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, April 2012, Latest Developments in 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/A/2012/03 (No. 1) (Apr. 2012). 
7. ICSID’s most recent statistics indicate that approximately 10 percent of the cases administered by 
ICSID are brought pursuant to the Additional Facility Rules. See World Bank, ICSID Caseload – 
Statistics, Issue 2013-1 at 8 (2013). 
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Second, ICSID awards are still subject to challenge. Conceptually, the ICSID scheme 
is arguably superior; the ICSID Convention requires that Contracting States enforce a 
pecuniary award rendered under the Convention “as if it were a final judgment of a court 
in that State,”8 and therefore should not be subject to national court review as is the case 
for New York Convention awards.9 But there are problems with assuming that this 
straightforward scheme leads to higher compliance. As an initial matter, ICSID does 
contemplate potential annulment of the award by an annulment committee. While 
annulment is supposed to be restricted to narrow grounds, there have been some high-
profile instances of committees annulling awards arguably outside the scope of their 
limited mandate.10 Also, ICSID awards, like other international arbitral awards, are 
subject to challenge in national courts on the same bases available under domestic law to 
challenge any final judgment. In the United States, for example, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) provides for challenge of a final judgment on the bases of, inter alia, 
mistakes, newly discovered evidence, fraud by an opposing party, lack of impartiality of 
 
8. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States Regulations and Rules art. 54(1), Mar. 18, 1965, available at  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (reprinted in 
Apr. 2006) [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (providing in full “[e]ach Contracting State shall 
recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the 
pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that State.  A Contracting State with a federal constitution may 
enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall 
treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.”). 
9. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 
1958, 25 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. National courts may 
refuse to recognize and enforce an award under the New York Convention on seven grounds. 
These grounds are interpreted narrowly in many, if not most, jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sylvia 
Tonova, Compliance and Enforcement of Awards: Is There a Practical Difference between ICSID 
and Non-ICSID Awards?, in 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 229, 
246 (Ian A. Laird and Todd J. Weiler eds., 2012). 
10. See, e.g., Lucy F. Reed and Giorgio Francesco Mandelli, Ad hoc or ad arbitrum? An Audit of 
Recent ICSID Annulment Decisions, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2011, 70 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2012) (discussing the 
controversial annulment decisions in Helnan Int’l Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/19 (annulment proceeding), Decision of the ad hoc Committee (June 14, 2010); 
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (annulment proceeding), 
Decision on Application for Annulment (June 29, 2010), available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&doc
Id=DC1550_En&caseId=C8; Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3 (annulment proceeding), Decision on Application for Annulment (July 30, 2010), 
available at  http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf; Compañia de 
Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (annulment 
proceeding), Decision on Application for Annulment (Aug. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0221.pdf); Christoph Schreuer, From 
ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Halfway Down the Slippery Slope, in 10 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 211 (2011); and Promod Nair and Claudia Ludwig, 
ICSID Annulment Awards: The Fourth Generation?, 5 GLOBAL ARB. REV., Issue 5, Oct. 28, 2010. 
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the decision-maker, and unequal knowledge and bargaining power.11 Similar grounds for 
challenge exist in the laws of Belgium, Chile, Colombia, France, Switzerland, and 
Venezuela.12  While it is important not to overstate the implications of this point, since 
such challenges do not appear to be a serious issue in current practice, the prospect of 
challenge on these bases remain. 13  
Third, there is as yet little empirical proof that the ICSID enforcement regime leads to 
higher rates of compliance than the New York Convention regime.14 Generally speaking, 
most States voluntarily comply with investment arbitration awards against them. A 2008 
study, for example, found that 81 percent of participating corporations did not enforce or 
seek to enforce arbitral awards against States, namely because of high rates of voluntary 
compliance and the negotiation of post-award settlements.15 The States that do resist 
compliance with awards have done so regardless of the arbitral fora. Argentina, for 
example, continues to resist enforcement of ICSID and non-ICSID awards alike.16 The 
bottom line appears to be that States that want access to international markets and 
capital will comply with adverse arbitration awards, regardless of the arbitral institution 
or rules by which the award was rendered. 
Fourth, there are a number of practical concerns that may counsel in favor of non-
ICSID arbitration options for a particular client or dispute. The cost and time of ICSID 
arbitrations are a significant factor weighing in favor of less costly alternatives.17 The 
 
11. FED R. CIV. P. 60(b); see also Freya Baetens, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: “To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID” is Not the Question, in 5 INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 211, 
219-20 (Ian A. Laird and Todd J. Weiler, eds. 2012); Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor, and Michael 
Nolan, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23(1)  J. INT’L ARB. 1, 9-11 (2006). 
12. See Baetens, supra note 10, at 220 (citing CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.][CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE] art. 1480 (Fr.); CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.][CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 
1704 (Belg.); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS INTERNATIONAL PRIVATRECHT [IPRG][FED. ACT ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 190(2) (Switz.); CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL 
[C.P.C.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 244 (Venez.)); Baldwin et al., supra note 10, at 14 
(discussing CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL [C.P.C.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] arts. 365, 379 
(Colom.) and CÓDIGO DE PROCEDIMENTO CIVIL [CÓD. PROC. CIV.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 810 
(Chile)). 
13. See. e.g.,  Tonova, supra note 8, at 239–40. 
14. See Baetens, supra note 10, at 211, 227 (remarking that the “admittedly limited” jurisprudence 
indicates that ICSID and non-ICSID awards are challenged in domestic courts at similar rates). 
15. Crina Baltag, Special Section on the 2008 Survey on Corporate Attitudes Towards Recognition and 
Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards: Enforcement of Awards Against States, 19 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 391, 403–08 (2008). 
16. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Argentina by the Numbers: Where Things Stand with Investment 
Treaty Claims Arising Out of the Argentine Financial Crisis, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER 
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110201_9 (discussing unpaid and challenged 
arbitration awards against Argentina in both the ICSID and UNCITRAL systems). 
17. See LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON, AND NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBIRATION 154–55 
(2011) (although ICSID administrative and arbitrator costs are relatively low compared to other 
international arbitration regimes, parties’ legal costs are “typically high,” due to the frequent 
separation of the jurisdictional phase, the complexity of the legal and factual issues in 
international investment law, the number and length of written pleadings, and the use of fact 
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availability of interim relief from national courts in non-ICSID arbitrations is another 
important reason that non-ICSID arbitration is sometimes preferable.18 Jurisdictional 
thresholds also factor into advice to clients. The ICSID framework arguably has more 
stringent jurisdictional thresholds, requiring an “investment” to fall within the scope of 
both the definition of “investment” in the relevant contract or treaty and the 
interpretation of an “investment” under the ICSID Convention.19 Finally, considerations 
relating to confidentiality can also favor non-ICSID options. While ICSID can require the 
Secretariat to publish excerpts of a tribunal’s legal reasoning and the names of the 
parties,20 some rules, such as the ICC Rules, contain no transparency requirements. An 
investor that does not want public disclosure of a dispute might favor non-ICSID 
arbitration. This factor may become irrelevant, however, as other arbitral institutions, 
including UNCITRAL, adopt transparency requirements.21 
All of these considerations serve to challenge the notion that ICSID is necessarily 
superior to non-ICSID arbitration options, which Professor Yackee’s model continues to 
suggest. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that access to international 
arbitration—the adjudication of a dispute by a neutral, international body—is of 
immense value to investors regardless of the forum. In view of the lack of empirical 
evidence suggesting otherwise and the inherent value of access to international 
arbitration, I would accordingly rank ICSID-only ISDS clauses on an equal level with 
those clauses designating only a non-ICSID option. In the model I propose, both types of 
clauses are assigned a value of 1. 
My final, and from the methodological perspective, most important critique of 
Professor Yackee’s model relates to the exclusion from his analysis of BITs with no ISDS 
clauses at all and BITs with ISDS clauses that limit the arbitral tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, such as the “compensation only” clauses mentioned above.22 I disagree that 
 
witnesses and experts at hearings); Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take?, 
4 GLOBAL ARB. REV., no. 5, 2009 (reporting that the average length of an ICSID arbitration is 3.6 
years, from the filing of the request for arbitration to the date of the final award, but that this 
timeline is shortening; the average timeline for the 32 cases commenced the five years preceding 
the study was closer to 3.2 years) 
18. See Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to 
ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 285, 316 (Albert Jan van den Berg, ed. 2009). 
19. See, e.g., Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43, 48 (6 
August 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 121 (2009) (applying the “double barrel” test). 
20. See ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceeding Rule 48(4) (April 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf; ICSID 
Administrative and Financial Regulations Regulation 22 (April 2006), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
21. See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (adopted by 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on 11 July 2013) (providing for 
public hearings, publication of case information and pleadings, and submissions by third parties). 
22. Yackee, supra note 1, at 294. 
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these two categories of BITs are “conceptually irrelevant,”23 at least as to studies 
assessing the strength of ISDS clauses in investment treaties. ISDS clauses that limit 
the arbitration tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction are inherently weaker than clauses 
that include a “full delegation” as to subject matter.24 BITs that include no provision for 
the settlement of disputes between investors and states are weaker still. I would assign 
both of these categories a value of 0 rather than exclude them from the analysis. It is 
important to note that excluding these categories of BITs restricts the inferences made to 
within the scope of the remaining treaties included; thus potentially valuable information 
is discarded. Moreover, the causal relationships between independent variables and 
treaty type may differ at the “lower” end of weaker treaty types. 
IV. Revised Model and Conclusions 
Going back to the purpose of the underlying analysis, this empirical research on BITs 
considers treaties as dependent variables and attempts to explain why States sign BITs 
or why they sign BITs with particular provisions. As described above, for purposes of my 
regression model, I use the following coding:  
?I agree with Professor Yackee that an ISDS clause providing a choice between 
ICSID and non-ICSID arbitration should be assigned the highest value of 2; 
?I disagree with Professor Yackee’s assignment of a value of 1 to ICSID-only 
clauses and 0 to clauses designating only non-ICSID fora. Instead, I rank an ISDS 
providing for international arbitration, whether ICSID-only or a non-ICSID option, 
equally, and assign a value of 1; and 
?I disagree with Professor Yackee’s exclusion of BITs with no ISDS clauses at all 
and BITs with ISDS clauses that limit the arbitral tribunal’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. I instead assign those categories a value of 0.  
I should note that I only changed the coding of the dependent variable. I did not 
attempt alternative model specifications using different independent variables, nor did I 
perform any model diagnostics, as making valid inferences based on this analysis was not 
my goal. Rather, my intent simply was to explore the extent to which estimated 
coefficients from Professor Yackee’s model were subject to change based on the values 
assigned to treaty type. 
By making just these two changes to the dependent variable, the model produced 
quantitatively and qualitatively different results. Figure 1 below displays estimated 
coefficients from both models along with their 90% confidence interval, ordered by the 
magnitude of Professor Yackee’s estimates.25 
 
23. Id. at 293.  
24. Id. at 285-86. 
25. I followed Professor Yackee’s choice of an alpha level of 0.10. For purposes of display, the following 
independent variables were re-scaled: polity durability is per decade, host GDP growth rate is per 
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In particular, the host colony and host IBRD dummy variables, which had exhibited 
statistically significant negative associations with treaty strength in Professor Yackee’s 
model, were substantially attenuated in my model and lost statistical significance. The 
FDI outflow variable similarly was attenuated and lost statistical significance in my 
model. Conversely, the “ICSID signed” dummy variable and host GDP growth rate had 
been statistically insignificant in Professor Yackee’s model, but each exhibited a stronger 
(and statistically significant) negative relationship with treaty strength in my model. The 
estimated associations (or lack thereof) with host polity durability, GDP difference, polity 
rating, and calendar year were qualitatively similar in our two models. 
To illustrate the differences in conclusions that might be drawn between the two 
models, consider host GDP growth: the negative association between a State’s preference 
for strong dispute resolution clauses and the host State’s GDP growth is consistent with 
the theory of Professors Allee and Peinhard that the variance in ISDS clauses can be 
explained by the relative bargaining power of States, and in particular, that high-
performing States prefer, and negotiate for, weak dispute resolution clauses. But this is 
the precise opposite of Professor Yackee’s results, which indicate a positive association, 
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suggesting that better-performing host States are more likely to accept strong ISDS 
clauses. The other differences in model estimates described above lead to similar 
divergences in interpretation. 
All told, Professor Yackee’s model does not demonstrate that there is in fact “apparent 
tension with Allee and Peinhardt’s theory Here, the limitations of an analysis that 
merely “reconstructs,” (i.e., applying the re-coding to a “reconstructed” data set) rather 
than “replicates” (i.e., apply the re-coding to Allee and Peinhardt’s original data) become 
stark, since this approach cannot present or permit a true comparison between these 
studies of BIT provisions.  
However, the regression model I ran with my re-coding and changed inputs is based 
on Professor Yackee’s data, so that model does in fact “replicate” his analysis to permit a 
comparison between the results of his and my models. That comparison indicates that 
the changes in the dependent variable did in fact result in divergences in interpretation. 
That means, in turn, that the judgment used to “code” the strength of ISDS clauses is 
demonstrably important. This supports Professor Yackee’s basic premise that such 
decisions are better left to legal professionals who are experts in the field, and that social 
scientists can benefit from collaborating with such professionals when devising empirical 
research studies.  
As I have seen in my practice, sound empirical work has tremendous potential to 
inform legal analysis and drive policy. Before it can do so, however, a more systematic 
and scientific approach must be taken toward the incorporation of legal expertise into 
empirical research.  
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Appendix 1: Model Comparison Results 
 
PROFESSOR YACKEE 
MODEL      
depvar_best Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
------------ ------------ -------------- ------ -------- -------------- ---------- 
home_fdi_o~s -0.04287 0.021714 -1.97 0.048 -0.08543 -0.00032 
host_colony -0.36788 0.19695 -1.87 0.062 -0.75389 0.018139 
host_polity2 0.0333 0.00502 6.63 0 0.023461 0.043139 
host_polit~y 0.000752 0.003394 0.22 0.825 -0.0059 0.007404 
host_gdp_g~h -0.00888 0.007548 -1.18 0.239 -0.02367 0.005913 
host_ibrd_~s -0.23973 0.138953 -1.73 0.084 -0.51207 0.032612 
icsid_signed -0.09169 0.137213 -0.67 0.504 -0.36062 0.177242 
diff_gdp 7.63E-14 7.24E-14 1.05 0.292 -6.56E-14 2.18E-13 
year_counter 0.063601 0.021592 2.95 0.003 0.021282 0.105919 
       
AMIRFAR MODEL      
cma_nomissing Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
------------ ------------ -------------- ------ -------- -------------- ---------- 
home_fdi_o~s -0.02453 0.02585 -0.95 0.343 -0.0752 0.026135 
host_colony -0.04763 0.117065 -0.41 0.684 -0.27707 0.181813 
host_polity2 0.02702 0.006582 4.11 0 0.01412 0.039919 
host_polit~y 0.001268 0.003271 0.39 0.698 -0.00514 0.007679 
host_gdp_g~h -0.02442 0.005546 -4.4 0 -0.03529 -0.01355 
host_ibrd_~s -0.00777 0.099534 -0.08 0.938 -0.20286 0.187311 
icsid_signed -0.20448 0.11972 -1.71 0.088 -0.43913 0.030163 
diff_gdp 9.22E-14 1.02E-13 0.9 0.365 -1.07E-13 2.92E-13 
year_counter 0.10074 0.021975 4.58 0 0.05767 0.14381 
 
  
